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An adequate farm bankruptcy law could make a fundamental 
contribution to the welfare and security of individual farmers 
and agriculture as a whole. The need for passing special legisla-
tion for farmers in financial distress, when there is time for 
clear thinking, is usually admitted. However, consideration of 
such a law has been pushed into the background because of the 
overwhelming interest in price support legislation. 
Although there have been numerous bills introduced in Con-
gress during the past decade dealing with the problem of farmer 
bankruptcies, to date none has been passed. In general, these bills 
have been of two kinds: (1) a "debt adjustment" type bill and 
(2) a "moratorium" type bill. 
A few years ago, the United States Senate and some mem-
bers of the legal profession1 strongly endorsed a "debt adjust-
ment" type bill drafted by the National Bankruptcy Conference.2 
This bill, hereafter called the "N.B.C. bill," would have replaced 
section 75 of the bankruptcy laws (commonly called the Frazier-
Lemke Act which expired in 1949) 3 with a permanent chapter 
XVI of the United States bankruptcy laws. The N.B.C. bill-
like section 75-permitted a complete debt adjustment through a 
composition or redemption, and it has been introduced repeatedly. 
Section 75 has been and still is the object of sharp contro-
versies, and the views of those who opposed section 75, and 
* The assistance of James Munger in assembling part of this material 
is hereby gratefully acknowledged. 
t .Associate Professor of .Agricultural Economics, University of Ne-
braska. 
1 Comment, 56 Yale L.J. 982 (1947). For unpublished critical com-
ments of the bill, see my statement submitted to Subcommittee No. 2 of 
the House Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings on S. 25; H.R. 447; H.R. 
1068; and H.R. 3694, Uniform System of Bankruptcy, Washington, D.C., 
May 21, 1954, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Uni-
form System of Bankruptcy of the House Committee on the Juc11c1ary, 83d 
Cong., 2d Sess., at 25 (1954). 
2 For a brief history of this draft, see Kruse, Re-establishing the Avail-
ability of Farmer Debtor Relief under the Bankruptcy .Act, 39 Minn. L. 
Rev. 735 (1955). 
3.Actually only subsection (s) of section 75, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934), 
11 U.S.C. § 203 (s) (1940) is properly called the Frazier-Lemke .Act. 
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similar legislation, e.g., the N.B.C. bill, have recently found con-
crete e}..."J)ression in an alternative bill of the "moratorium type."4 
This bill, which would also add a permanent chapter XVI to 
existing bankruptcy laws, provides in principle for only a federal 
judicial moratorium. The congressional history of these bills 
since 1949 is briefly outlined in the following table: 
Type of bill introduced in Congress 
Congress Debt adjustment bills 
81st 
82d 
S. 938 : passed by Senate 
S. 25 : put aside in fa-
vor of S. 25A by 
Senate Sub-Com-
mittee 
83d H.R. 1068 : see next col-
umn 
None in Senate 
84th (S. 316) : see text 
Moratorium bills 
S. 25A: passed by Senate 
S. 25 passed by Senate as 
in previous year, with 
minor amendments 
H.R. 447 and 3584: hearings 
held, (also on H.R. 
1068) 
No action taken 
S. 689 : passed by Senate July 
12, 1955 
H.R. 670 : no action to date 
Note: Except for minor details, the bills in each column are identical. 
House bills mentioned only for the past two years. 
Permanent debt adjustment legislation has been abandoned 
for the time being. But temporary legislation was re-introduced 
recently by Senator Watkins with S. 316 which proposes that 
subsection ( c) of section 75 be amended by striking out the date 
4 This legislation was first drafted by the National Farm Loan Associa-
tion of California, Nevada, Arizona and Utah, and endorsed by leading 
insurance companies and the American Bankers Association. See L. 
Ferguson. Shall We Have a Permanent Frazier Lemke Law?, a pamphlet 
distributed by the Equitable Life Assurance Society of The United States, 
Jan. 20, 1950 and Parkinson: Frazier Lemke Rides Again, Bankers Monthly 
(Dec. 1951). Only the American Bankers Association repeatedly main-
tained that existing bankruptcy laws (particularly chapter XII) are fully 
adequate to protect farmers; but that if some legislation was to be passeu, 
it would endorse the moratorium bill. See also, Hearings on S. 25 Before 
a Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 
1st and 2d Sess. (June 19 and July 17, 1951, and February 7, 1952). 
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"March 1, 1949" and the date "March 1, 1956" be inserted in lieu 
thereof.5 This turn of events makes a discussion of section 75 
and other farmer debtor relief bills all the more timely. 
II. THE VULNERABILITY OF AGRICULTURE AND OBJECTIVES 
OF FARMER DEBTOR RELIEF LEGISLATION 
In contrast to the business sector, agriculture has gone 
through more years of economic hardship than of economic pros-
perity during the last thirty-five years. Even in recent years, 
slight downward trends in general economic conditions-such as 
in 1949 and 1953-resulted in noticeable agricultural declines, and 
agriculture can be expected to remain as vulnerable to adverse 
economic fluctuations as in the past. 
In some areas farmers face additional risks and uncertain-
ties. In the plains states, for instance, relatively normal years 
are succeeded by years with low rainfall, and yields are reduced 
to next to nothing. Dry years cannot be predicted. Studies have 
indicated no regular pattern in the succession of wet and dry 
years. Other areas with highly specialized agriculture-e.g., Cali-
fornia's citrus industry-are also subject to weather risks. Hard-
ships caused by unfavorable weather and economic conditions, or 
both, have been as demoralizing to agricultural communities and 
individuals as prolonged unemployment has been to industrial 
workers and their families. A dramatic example of the hopeless 
situation in which many farmers found themselves was cited in 
one North Dakota case, in which the judge stated: 
This case is one of a large group involving much the same 
situation insofar as the facts are concerned. . . . The only live-
stock the farmer owns, according to his testimony, is 3 horses, 
5 cows, and 3 young stock. All stock is mortgaged. Even assum-
ing the increase therefrom was not covered by mortgage, it is 
readily apparent that the proceeds to be derived from the sale 
of increase would be negligible. . . . The record indicates that 
he has had no paying crop since 1928. At present the debtor 
has no seed to plant a crop. . . . At the first meeting of credi-
tors, he was asked this question: "Have you got enough equip-
ment and help so that you could farm all of the plow land on 
your place?" Answer: "Well, no, I haven't. I farmed until I 
am just about no good myself and machinery and horses and 
everything is shot." He testified further that he wanted to be 
sure there was plenty of rain before he would put in a kernel of 
seed. As to his buildings he said: "The sun and the wind are 
just beating them up so we can look through them any place. . . 
I have lived in sand storms for years. Lots of days we had to 
5 S. 689, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), was passed in the Senate on 
July 12, 1955, without any discussion, and no mention was made on that 
day of S. 316, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). 
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take the family and drive away." He says that he ... worked 
three months on W.P.A. last fall and has been receiving some 
relief. He testified that unless his debts were adjusted enough 
he could not make good.6 
Farm foreclosures and bankruptcies which characterize agri-
cultural depressions have serious social as well as economic im-
plications. They force farmers off their farms and homes ; or 
they result in a change of status, such as owners becoming ten-
ants or tenants becoming hired farm laborers. In the thirties, 
large scale farm foreclosures and bankruptcies were accompanied 
by social unrest, difficulties of law enforcement, and breakdown 
of the credit structure. Collective action by farmers which 
amounted to an interference with the enforcement of creditors' 
rights was not even criticized by the public. 
When industrial activity is high during periods of agricul-
tural depressions, farmers who lose their farms find non-agricul-
tural employment elsewhere if they have the necessary training, 
skill, and adaptability. But when there is widespread non-agri-
cultural unemployment, farmers who are displaced from their 
farms swell the ranks of the unemployed. 
The relative prosperity of farmers in recent years and the 
element of stability that has been introduced with price support 
programs should not be used as arguments against farmer-debtor 
relief legislation. Today, farm income is relatively high, real 
estate indebtedness low. Mortgages are mostly on a long-term 
basis, the rate of interest relatively low. In case of distress sev-
eral government agencies now provide for agricultural credit or 
some financial support on a limited scale. These factors diff eren-
tiate the 1950s from the 1920s and 1930s and seem to make a 
recurrence of a disastrous agricultural depression more unlikely. 
However, new elements, which modern farming methods and 
the change of farm life have introduced into the agricultural 
economy, could, under given circumstances, seriously threaten 
the present favorable situation. Today, operating cash expenses 
and capital expenses on equipment and buildings are very high. 
On farms operated exclusively or primarily by family labor, an-
nual cash needs of three to fifteen thousand dollars (depending 
on the type of farming) are not unusual. If farm prices or 
incomes are low, these expenses could result in a very rapidly 
6 In re Anderson, 22 F. Supp. 928 (D.N.D. 1938). In recent inter-
views with farmers who have gone through section 75 procedures, it has 
again become evident that the depression of the thirties has left a clear 
and detailed imprint on the memories of those who struggled through it. 
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rising, potentially dangerous indebtedness. Most farmers can-
not accumulate reserves sufficiently large to overcome a prolonged 
period of distress without outside assistance. In recent inter-
views with farmers, bankers, and others, there was widespread 
conviction that two consecutive years of drastically lower farm 
incomes would seriously threaten many farms. Under these 
circumstances, farmers may even find it difficult to borrow funds, 
on a large scale, from local or national credit institutions. 
Price support programs cannot prevent individual farmers 
from falling into financial distress. Price supports depend on 
congressional appropriations, and mounting surpluses exert ever-
increasing pressure on Congress to set support prices at as low 
a level as is consistent with the stated support policy in order to 
minimize government expenditures. Also, price supports do not 
affect all crops or livestock. They are of no assistance when 
farm production and incomes decline because of unfavorable 
weather. Thus, it should be clear that farmers are not now 
immune to financial distress on a national or regional scale. 
Therefore, the objectives of farmer-debtor relief are: (a) 
to prevent farm foreclosures and farm bankruptcies in the event 
of nation-wide, regional, or local distress; (b) to keep individual 
farmers on their farms and homes; and (c) to preserve for indi-
vidual farmers their status as owners or tenants. 
The objectives of this legislation cannot be realized without a 
compromise between the interests of individual farmers, of the 
lenders, and of society as a whole. Legislation which permits 
farmers to keep their farms through moratoria or by altering 
their long-term or short-term, secured or unsecured debts cannot 
fail to affect creditors deeply. To prevent creditors from fore-
closing on a mortgage cuts deeply into their right to enforce their 
claims. A careful balance must there! ore be struck between pre-
serving our agricultural economy and society on one side and the 
credit structure on the other; therefore, no one-sided approach 
can result in such a balance.7 
It is perhaps not superfluous to point out that the "interests 
of creditors" are not necessarily identical. Some private lenders 
and some large credit institutions, such as insurance companies 
which consider farm real estate loans as a long-term investment, 
could withstand a farm moratorium or even a debt adjustment 
7 The Frazier-Lemke Act has been accused of being socialistic. Nothing 
could be more erroneous. The purpose of section 75 was to preserve the 
farm (private property) to the individual farmer and thus to maintain 
and strengthen the private ownership pattern. 
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with relative ease. In this connection it is noteworthy that United 
States life insurance companies have only a relatively small pro-
portion of their mortgages in farms (8 percent in 1953) .8 On 
the other hand, local banks are primarily interested in liquidity. 
A moratorium or debt adjustment would affect them more seri-
ously. Small private lenders-who incidentally now hold a high 
proportion of all farm mortgages-often depend on interest rates 
from loans for their livelihood. These factors complicate a solu-
tion to the problem. 
III. A STUDY OF THE FRAZIER-LEMKE ACT IN ACTION 
Was section 75 successful in effectuating "a broad program 
of rehabilitation of distressed farmers faced with the disaster of 
forced sales and an oppressive burden of debt. . . ?"9 A recent 
study on the impact and effectiveness of the Frazier-Lemke Act 
shows that, prima facie, section 75 was not effective legislation, 
particularly during its first five or six years of operation.10 
However, an examination of the circumstances under which the 
law operated shows that the failure of the law to be more success-
fully applied was due to causes not necessarily inherent in the 
law itself, nor in the ends which it attempted to achieve. 
Section 75 failed to halt the tide of farm foreclosures during 
the thirties.11 For example, in South Dakota alone, there were 
approximately 20,000 foreclosures between 1933 and 1949, but 
only 251 section 75 cases were recorded in the state during that 
period. The ratio between foreclosures and section 75 cases was 
equally low in other states, except North Dakota where 2,651 
petitions were filed. The following table shows the approximate 
number of foreclosure sales in the Dakotas between 1933-38 and 
1939-49: 
s Life Insurance Fact Book 76 (1955). 
9 Wright v. Union Central Life Insurance, 311 U.S. 273 (1940). 
10 This study has not yet been completed. Tentative conclusions have 
been published: Munger, A Preliminary Study of Farmer Bankruptcy Ex-
periences in the Dakotas, 1928-1952, Agri. Econ. Pamphlet 61, S.D. State 
College, Brookings, S.D. (Mar. 19155). This study, made possible through 
the assistance of the USDA, is based on a detailed analysis of federal 
court records, county foreclosure and real estate records, and personal 
interviews of individuals connected with the operation of section 75 in 
various capacities in several plains states. Some problems raised by sec-
tion 75 may, however, never be fully answered because of the difficulties 
inherent in such a historical analysis. 
11 Thousands of farmers also lost their farms by voluntarily transferring 
title to their creditors, thus making foreclosure unnecessary. 
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Period North Dakota South Dakota 
1933-38 9,217* 15,887 
1939-49 7,506 3,769 
Total 16,723 19,656 
::: 1934-38 as 1933 data was not available. 
The low number of section 75 petitions does not necessarily 
indicate that farmers had no intention of making use of the act.12 
Immediately after the enactment of section 75 and again after 
the law was declared constitutional in 1937, the number of peti-
tions by distressed farmers increased rapidly,13 so that the aware-
ness of farmers as to the potential assistance which section 75 
promised them can be taken for granted.14 
The law seems even less effective if one considers the small 
number of cases in which farmers apparently obtained some direct 
relief-through composition, extension, or a successful redemp-
tion procedure--and the large number of cases which were dis-
missed by the courts apparently without giving the petitioners 
any kind of relief. A petition can be deemed successful if, as a 
result of the action, the farmer succeeds in retaining his farm.10 
The following two tables show the general disposition of all sec-
tion 75 cases in the Dakotas, and the outcome of the petitions 
12 An analysis of bankruptcy cases by type of farming areas shows that 
the number of section. 75 cases per 1,000 farms was smaller in the very 
high risk areas of the Dakotas than in the less risky, more diversified 
farm communities where the drought was less severe. The explanation 
is that many farmers in the highest risk areas simply abandoned their 
farms and homes because they had no resources left and no income from 
their farms. 
13 In North Dakota, where the drought lasted until 1942, the highest 
number of cases was recorded in 1937 and 1942. 
14 Claims have been made that section 75 was used by "unscrupulous" 
farmer~ for the purpose of "taking advantage" of their creditors; or that 
only "dishonest" farmers were resorting to it. In interviews with bankers 
and other creditors, these claims have not been confirmed. Besides the 
obvious fact that laws are passed so that people can use them, section 75 
was apparently used by farmers in the majority of instances with the 
honest intention of keeping their farms and homes. As a corollary, the 
fact that a farmer had applied for relief under section 75 had little or no 
adverse effect on his credit rating. One banker specifically mentioned 
several "good" farmers who had used the Frazier-Lemke Act and were 
still obtaining credit from him at this time. 
lo This is disclosed by an analysis of federal court records and county 
deed (including foreclosure) records. 
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for six sample count-ies where section 75 cases were studied in 
detail.16 




































Farmers stayed Farmers Farmers stayed Farmers 
Period on farm lost farm Uncertain on farm lost farm Uncertain 
N.D.S.D. 
1933-38 3 10 
1939-49 21 1 
Total 24 11 
















Note: Among the "uncertain" cases are those involving tenants. One 
South Dakota case was dismissed because the petitioner was not 
a farmer. In some dismissed cases, the farmers were granted a 
delay but lost their farms anyway. In a few dismissed cases where 
farmers retained their farms, it could not be determined whether 
the petition was or was not the reason for the success. 
16 For reasons explained in the text below, the data are presented sepa-
rately for 1933-38 and 1939-49 and were classified by disposition (i.e., 
dismissal or discharge). Whether a "dismissal" of a section 7 5 petition 
will result in relief more frequently than a "discharge" cannot be stated 
without looking at the records of each individual case. Section 75 pro-
vides that petitions are to be dismissed in a number of circumstances, 
such as where a voluntary composition or extension agreement has been 
reached under court control. In some cases which were studied an agree-
ment may have been reached between the parties outside of court and 
the cases were dismissed because of lack of further action by the peti-
tioners. Thus in some dismissal cases relief was obtained by farmers. 
Particularly North Dakota cases were dismissed in later years upon re-
quest of the conciliation commissioners because agreements were reached. 
Incidentally, this resulted in a relatively rapid disposal of the cases. 
However in earlier years, as shown in the tables, petitioners obtained 
little relief in dismissal cases and the large proportion of these cases is one 
indication of the difficulties which farmers faced under section 75. In 
later years the proportion of "discharged" cases became much larger, 
and it can be assumed that in nearly all instances the farmers obtained 
the relief provided by the act. 
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It should be observed that the data for South Dakota reflects more 
correctly the situation in the nation as a whole than the North 
Dakota data, for reasons explained below. 
A. Reasons for Failure 
Several factors contributed singly or in combination to the 
apparent failure of the law. 
1. Even after the law was enacted, a large number of fore-
closures had already been initiated and completed (or nearly 
completed) ; therefore, section 75 was of no assistance to most 
of the foreclosed farmers. 
2. The act was poorly written (as acknowledged even by 
its defenders) and judges, conciliation commissioners, and others 
had difficulty in interpreting or applying it. For instance, some 
of the earlier cases which were studied were handled like regular 
bankruptcy cases, even though they were begun as section 75 
procedures, the assets being placed in the hands of a trustee or 
with the appointment of a referee, the assets being disposed of 
like in regular bankruptcy and the petitioners being discharged. 
3. The lower courts were hostile to the legislation. This 
was probably one of the most important factors that discouraged 
farmers from petitioning under the act. The unsympathetic at-
titude of the courts became rapidly known in farm communities. 
Many of the arguments used to justify a refusal to grant relief 
to petitioning farmers were accepted by the courts in order to 
assist the creditors more than the farmers. These arguments 
were often developed in cases which served as precedents for a 
large number of denials of subsequent petitions. The difficulties 
which farmers in distress encountered when resorting to section 
75, while sometimes acknowledged, have never been sufficiently 
appreciated and appraised.17 
The constitutionality of the act was questioned promptly in 
a large number of cases. It was not upheld until 1937.18 For 
17 See, however, the excellent article, Letzler, Bankruptcy Reorganiza-
tion for Farmers, 40 Col. L. Rev. 1133 (1940). 
18 Wright v. Vinton Branch Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 400 (1937). 
In this connection, it is interesting to note that opponents of section 75 
still continue to refer to this act in a manner which would leave doubts 
as to its constitutionality. Collier, Bankruptcy Manual § 75.00, 1057 (2d 
ed. 1954) states: "Despite the hardships it imposes upon creditors, § 
75s has been held constitutional"; and 5 Collier, Bankruptcy para. 715.03, 
124 (1945) declares: " ••. as a general proposition .•• section 75 iS' 
well within the bankruptcy power and ••• its validity is now firmly estab-
lished." (Italics Supplied) 
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several years the legislation was therefore practically useless. 
After 1937, other reasons for dismissal were proferred by the 
courts. In the Dakotas, just as elsewhere, cases were dismissed 
because of "lack of good faith" ; and lack of resources on the part 
of the farmer at the time of his petition was held to be a lack of 
good faith in applying for relief. A typical example of the hos-
tile attitude of a court, in a typical farm community, can be 
found in a Brown County, South Dakota case.19 There the court, 
while holding that the order adjudicating debtor a bankrupt upon 
his said amendment petition was erroneous and without authority 
of law and improvidently entered, said, in dismissing the case: 
. . . . that the object and intention of the debtor in sub-
mitting said proposal was to hold possession of all his property 
as long as he might do so and use and enjoy the same and keep 
it away from his secured creditors without any reasonable pros-
pect of liquidating his debts or of financial rehabilitation; and 
the debtor hoped and intended thereby to prevent secured and 
preferred creditors from pursuing their legal remedies and to 
delay and defraud said creditors and use up and exhaust their 
property. 
That said debtor . . . omitted . . . to offer to his creditors 
a proposal for compromise and extension which included an equit-
able and feasible method of liquidation for secured creditors ... 
and omitted to make in good faith any offer or proposal of com-
promise or extension complying with the requirements of the 
Bankruptcy Act. 
This decision seems to be in obvious contradiction not only to pre-
vious Supreme Court rulings but also to the text of section 75. 
The records of the case also disclose that the petitioner had in 
fact made a proposal and that it had been rejected by the credi-
tors.20 The case is astounding since section 75 (s) specifically 
provided that the petitioner "may amend his (original) petition 
asking to be adjudged a bankrupt." 
19 This order was made in the case of a Brown County (South Dakota) 
farm widow and the case was dismissed in March 1939. In re Alatalo, 26 
F. Supp. 276 (D.S.D. 1939). Henceforth, twenty-three other petitions 
from the same county were rejected on the same grounds at the same 
time. For further details, see Munger, op. cit. supra note 10, at 50, 58, 
83. 
20 For the text of this proposal, see Munger, op. cit. supra note 10, 
at 83-84. To this point, Collier, Bankruptcy Manual, 1056, para. 75.00, 
1057 (2d ed. 1954) comments as follows: " ... it may fairly be said 
that in the vast majority of cases, the debtor's proceeding under those 
subdivisions [§ 7 5 ( a-r) ] has been instituted merely to provide a stepping-
stone from which to reach the desired three-year moratorium under sub-
division (s). In substance, the debtor needs only to go through the motions 
of seeking to effect a composition or extension. . . ." In the debt-adjust-
ment bill, the composition or extension proposal does not precede the 
moratorium, as in section 75, and therefore is given much more weight. 
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In interpreting the law consistently in favor of the creditors 
and not the petitioners, the courts did not attempt to carry out 
the intent of Congress. The burden of reversing unfavorable de-
cisions rested primarily on the debtors.21 
Incidentally, in several early Dakota cases, the real estate of 
the farmer who had petitioned under section 75 was declared 
burdensome. As a result, the real estate was disposed of and 
the farmer lost his farm. Whether this was a method by which 
the provisions of the law were evaded cannot be stated. But the 
point bears keeping in mind when future legislation is being dis-
cussed. Obviously any method by which the farm could be taken 
out of the procedure altogether-when the object of the proce-
dure is to save the farm for the farmer-would be contrary to 
the intent of the law. 
4. The adamant attifo.de of creditors was often a serious 
handicap. Though the petitioners frequently made proposals to 
the creditors for a composition which seemed very favorable, at 
that time and in the light of the subsequent developments (such 
as prices at which creditors who had foreclosed resold the prop-
erty ten or twelve years later), their proposals were rejected and 
the cases dismissed. In some instances the petitioner even had 
firm commitments from the Federal Land Bank for refinancing 
purposes. 
5. Since farm credit was severely limited, many farmers 
apparently felt that it was useless to petition under section 75 
unless they could also obtain some funds at the same or a later 
time for the purpose of redemption. As one farmer put it when 
21 In 1939, the United States Supreme Court ruled as follows: "The 
subsections of section 75 which regulate the procedure in relation to the 
effort of a farmer-debtor to obtain a composition or extension contain no 
provision for a dismissal because of the absence of a reasonable prob-
ability of the financial rehabilitation of the debtor. Nor is there anything 
in these sub-sections which warrants the imputation of lack of good faith 
to a farmer-debtor because of that plight. The plain pzirpose of section 
75 was to afford relief to such debtors who found themselves in economic 
distress, however severe, by giving them the chance to seek an agreement 
with their creditors and, failing this, to ask for the other relief afforded 
by subsection (s). The farmer-debtor may offer to pay what he can ••• 
and he is not to be charged with bad faith in taking the course for which 
the statute expressly provides." (Italics supplied) John Hancock l\iutual 
Life Insurance Company v. Bartels, 308 U.S. 180 (1939). Section 926, S. 
689, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), of the moratorium bill and section 927, 
H.R. 1068, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) of the debt adjustment bill now pro-
vide that a farmer has the right to relief even where his financial position 
appears hopeless at the time of the petition. 
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recently interviewed: "Without money, you cannot refinance." 
Therefore, the creation of additional funds of credit for petitioning 
farmers should accompany farmer debtor relief legislation if far-
mers are to be in a position to take full advantage of the law.22 
The more serious the depression, the greater the need for such 
additional funds for refinancing purposes.23 
6. Several persons interviewed indicated either that it had 
been difficult for them to find an attorney to represent them in a 
section 75 proceeding, or that those that were representing farmers 
in such cases--such as conciliation commissioners--encountered 
difficulties in their professional activities and that their prof es-
sional reputation was affected adversely. 
Incidentally, this throws new light on the problem concern-
ing the role of conciliation commissioners and the argument 
whether a farmer-debtor relief procedure should be ref erred 
to a referee in bankruptcy or to a conciliation commissioner. The 
office of conciliation commissioner had been introduced by the 
Frazier-Lemke Act for the purpose of giving the distressed farm-
ers a sympathetic advisor and agent in court. It has been vigor-
ously denounced by creditors as being unfair to them. It has 
also been argued that in many areas conciliation commissioners 
were hard to locate and that many were unwilling to serve be-
cause of inadequate compensation, while at the same time their 
professional requirements had to be similar to those of a referee. 
Both the new debt adjustment and the moratorium bill pro-
vide for the reference of the procedure to a referee in bankruptcy. 
However, there seems to be little doubt that the office of concilia-
tion commissioner is highly useful in farm distress cases.24 Since 
22 One farmer who was interviewed thought that federal loans had been 
more helpful to farmers than the Frazier-Lemke Act. 
23 In this connection, the Swiss have set up excellent provisions for 
farm relief in which the rights of creditors and debtors are equally well 
protected. See Feder, Farmer-Debtor Relief Legislation in the United 
States and in Switzerland-A Lesson in Agricultural Policy?. Journal of 
Farm Economics 228 (May 1952). The main feature of this legislation 
consists in the issue of government bonds which secured creditors obtain 
in lieu of their (scaled down) claims against the farmer. The relation-
ship between creditors and farmers ceases and two new contracts arise: 
(1) between the creditor (bondholder) and the state and (2) between 
the farmer and the state. In the latter, the state becomes the farmer's 
creditor and the farmer must make annuity payments for a period of 
twenty years according to an amortization plan set up by the law. 
2! One of the witnesses in the hearings on the moratorium bill thought 
that conciliation commissioners "degrade" the procedure. He stated: 
"One thing we had in mind [in referring the procedure to a referee] was 
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farmer debtor relief legislation is designed, in principle, to assist 
farmers, the retention of this office seems highly advisable. But 
if the various shortcomings of that office are to be corrected, 
permanent legislation for farm relief should set up a federal 
agency designed especially to handle farmer bankruptcy cases, 
e.g., an office of conciliation commissioners. It c0uld be 0rganized 
as a separate division of the United States Department of Agri-
culture and consist of attorneys with e}..-perience in agriculture. 
Local state offices could be set up to consult with farmers, handle 
their affairs, and represent them in court in the same capacity 
as conciliation commissioners did under section 75. 
Such a proposal is to be taken all the more seriously since it 
has been found in the study that sometimes the federal courts 
were not sufficiently well equipped to handle a large number of 
farmer-debtor relief cases. 
7. Finally, lack of information, ine},.-perience, and ignorance 
of many farmers in legal matters and their natural disinclina-
tion to initiate court procedures may have accounted in part 
for the partial failure of section 75. Only in North Dakota was 
it a less important factor since farmers had been acquainted with 
the purpose and the provisions of the act through well organized 
community meetings and a press sympathetic to this legislation. 
B. The Indirect Effects of Section 75 
The preceding discussion is concerned with the direct effects 
of section 75 which can be documented. The indirect, "persua-
sive" effects of the Frazier-Lemke Act, which several commenta-
tors have repeatedly mentioned, cannot be assessed in quantita-
tive terms. The mere existence of the act and the threat of a 
prolonged court procedure is said to have forced many creditors 
who previously had adopted an adamant attitude in their dealings 
with the distressed farmers to come to some agreement with them, 
thus forestalling either a petition under section 75 or a redemp-
tion procedure under section 75 (s). .An out-of-court agreement 
between creditors and farmers could be reached in two ways: 
to get out of the conciliation commissions. We wanted to get it on a 
little higher plane rather than degrade the action; to get it on as high a 
plan as possible." (Italics suppled) Hearings, supra note 4, at 41. But the 
argument is based on a misunderstanding since under section 75 (a), a con-
ciliation commissioner was not eligible unless he was also eligible for ap-
pointment as referee and thus had the same professional qualifications. See 
also Comment, 56 Yale L.J. 982, 991 (1947) which considered the office 
of conciliation commissioner superior to a referee for the purpose of farm. 
relief. 
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either before the actual beginning of a section 75 petition, e.g., 
through the mere threat of the farmer to go to court; or after the 
petition. The study of North and South Dakota section 75 cases 
does not furnish much evidence that creditors came to an agree-
ment with their farmer-debtors after the introduction of a peti-
tion. Some cases were begun and later abandoned ("dismissed") 
because of lack of further action by the petitioner, possibly be-
cause an agreement was reached between the parties. But the 
number of these cases is small. (See the table on p. 46.) 
Thus the "persuasive" effects of section 75 probably were 
manifested through threat of the farmers to go to court. Several 
persons recently interviewed felt that this had indeed been the 
case,25 and the files show that some lenders were very concerned 
over the threat of a farmer to file a section 75 petition.26 
The number of distress cases and consequently of foreclosures 
and farm bankruptcies (with the exception of North Dakota) de-
clined radically after the start of World War II and the beginning 
of the agricultural recovery. At the same time, with the begin-
ning of the 1940s, a much larger proportion of section 75 cases 
resulted in relief for farmers as provided for in the law. For 
instance, in North and South Dakota a much higher proportion 
of the cases started between 1939 and 1949 resulted in farmers 
retaining their farms. The economic recovery, however, was not 
the only and probably not the major reason.27 After several 
crucial years of court experience and court tests, the validity of 
section 75 had finally been firmly established. 
2r; See Kruse, Re-establishing the Availability of Farmer Debtor Relief 
under the Bankruptcy Act, 39 1\Iinn. L. Rev. 735, 737 t1955); Schickele, 
Agricultural Policy 378-400 (1954); Hearings, supra note 4, at 51-56. 
26 l\Iany creditors were in as precarious a position as the farmers. Large 
institutional lenders, who could probably better afford a scale-down of 
their investment than small private lenders, had to have some protection 
and had obligations to their own creditors. This emphasizes the fact that 
section 75 was not a measure which fairly distributed in society the losses 
brought about by the depression. For a better solution, see infra note 23. 
On the whole, the continued large number of foreclosures would indicate 
that even the "persuasive" effects of section 7 5 were not overly extensive. 
21 Even in the early forties, real estate values were still low resulting 
in relatively low farm appraisals under section 75 (s) and consequently 
low redemption values for the petitioning farmers. Incidentally, one of 
the major points of disagreement between the sponsors and the opponents 
of debt-adjustment type bills is the official appraisal of the property of 
the petitioner. The appraisal of the farm is the basis for the actual 
scale-down of the debts, and determines to a large extent the precise loss 
which a creditor has to take, if any. The records of the section 75 cases 
were studied for the purpose of determining whether there was any basis 
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The conclusion can therefore be drawn that if a more ade-
quate law had been enacted and in force prior to, or even at the 
beginning of, the depression, and if section 75 had had the recogni-
tion in 1930 which it acquired by 1940, and assuming that ade-
quate sources for refinancing had been available, the wave of 
foreclosures and farm bankruptcies could well hai1,1e been avoi4ecl 
through the use of farmer-debtor relief procedures. Under the 
circumstances, it cannot be maintained that the redemption pro-
visions, i.e., the debt adjustment provisions, of section 75 have 
unduly tipped the scale in favor of the farmers. On the contrary, 
for the belief that the farm appraisals were intentionally low for the 
purpose of scaling down the debts to an inordinate degree. No evidence 
could be found for substantiating that belief . • On the contrary, there is 
evidence that farmers attempted to make their financial situation look 
as favorable as possible because, particularly in earlier years, courts were 
prone to reject those cases in which the farmer's position seemed hopeless. 
The actual appraisals were apparently in line with the then current real 
estate prices. Also, it seems altogether unlikely that a federal court 
would endorse an appraisal which would be obviously out of line with 
current conditions. The debt adjustment bill also provides for an ap-
praisal of the property "at its then fair and equitable market value." It 
would be preferable if the appraisal were made instead on the basis of a 
long-run value based on the income earning ability of the farm. In periods 
of severe agricultural depressions, this would raise the appraisal value 
above the market value. Such a provision would also tend to put a 
damper on inflationary price movements of land in the long run. It 
would make additional legislation for credit funds in farm relief cases 
obligatory. The redemption feature of the debt adjustment bills is also 
the basis for the argument, used by its opponents, that if Congress would 
enact such a bill, it would seriously curtail farm credit and thus work to 
the disadvantage of farmers themselves. 
The representative of the American Bankers Association stated that 
even the moratorium bill, which contains no redemption feature, would 
restrict credit because "It would not provide a definite time in which 
this matter would be ended .... if too much of a slant were given to the 
borrower, he could turn to and avail himself of this relief and it would 
add perhaps largely to the number of individuals who would seek such 
relief, and as cases came up and as the delay and the time was consumed 
there, using such a moratorium case, I think that that lender and his 
neighbors and whoever might know of it would be very much discouraged 
or enter into new similar contracts similar to the loan mortgage con-
tracts." Hearings, supra note 4, at 42-43. 
It has already been pointed out in Comment, supra note 1 that this 
argument has not been borne out in practice since farm credit increased 
during the 1940s even though section 75 was in operation. Lenders are 
more interested in the worthiness of the debtor, at the time of the loan, 
and his ability to repay than in some future contingencies such as that 
offered by a debt adjustment procedure. In recent years, institutional 
lenders have been conservative in their appraisals of farms. Hence, the 
risk of substantial losses through a redemption procedure is probably now 
smaller than it was in the thirties. 
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section 75 seems to have established some balance between (1) 
the absolute right of foreclosing with its serious effects on the 
agricultural society (and on credit) in periods of widespread 
distress and unrest, and (2) the farmers' wish to remain on their 
farms and homes .. 
The large amounts of legal commentaries, as well as practical 
experiences, accumulated during the life of section 75 should be-
come important guides in the drafting of a new bill. 
IV. THE MORATORIUM BILL: AN ANALYSI·S OF ITS 
MAJOR PROVISIONS 
In sub-committee hearings and on the floor of the Senate, 
it has been intimated repeatedly that the debt adjustment bill is 
similar to the moratorium proposal and that they differ only 
from a procedural, not a substantive viewpoint.28 This, however, 
2S For an analysis of the debt adjustment bill, see Comment, supra 
note 1. The following additional comments on the debt adjustment bill 
may be in order: 
(a) Section 947, H.R. 1068, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) provides 
for the granting by the court of a three-year moratorium to the peti-
tioning farmer. According to sections 986-987 the farmer may propose 
a composition or extension agreement ("plan") within the first two 
years of the moratorium. Section 988 enumerates the terms that such a 
"plan" may contain. But its wording is awkward. It contains permissive 
provisions (the plan "shall" include. . . . ) . It would be better legisla-
tive technique if the two types of provisions were grouped together. Sec-
tion 934(3) of H.R. 1068 is an improvement over S. 25, 82d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1951). The latter provided that after the appraisal of the property, 
but prior to the moratorium, the debtor was to file with the court "the 
offer of, and the terms of, payments to be made by him on the appraised 
value of such property." This is not to be confused with his "plan." 
H.R. 1068 states correctly instead: "the offer of rental to be paid by 
him on such property. . . ." If the bill should be re-introduced in the 
Senate, it should be made to read like H.R. 1068. 
If all creditors approve the "plan," the court confirms it (§ 989). 
If not all creditors approve, the court can confirm it nonetheless if a ma-
jority of the secured or unsecured creditors representing the majority of 
the amount of the claims approves (§ 990). But sections 988 and 990 are 
nearly incomprehensible. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1003-4, which 
attempts to summarize these sections in simple terms. Sections 990, 988(14) 
to which the former refers, appear to provide with respect to secured 
creditors that if not all secured creditors accept the "plan": ( 1) those 
that do not accept the "plan" must receive some adequate protection 
for the realization of the values of their claims, while (2) those who do 
accept must all accept unless they are divided into several classes, in which 
case the majority rule prevails (§ 990(1) (b)). It is hard to see why a 
bill to aid farmers and which is to be used in farm communities should 
be couched in such obscure language. Before being reintroduced in Con-
gress, these sections should be improved for readability and clarity. 
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(b) Sections 10·06-09 raise a more serious problem. According to 
these sections, a farmer has an alternative method of relief to the "plan." 
Under section 1006 the farmer can "redeem" the farm if he does not 
choose to propose a "plan," or if a plan cannot be worked out with his 
creditors. This is probably the correct meaning of the section which 
states: "Unless . . . a debtor's plan under this chapter is either pending 
or has been confirmed . . . the debtor may, at any time before the expira-
tion of three years after the entry of the order retaining the debtor in 
possession (granting the moratorium) ... file an application to redeem the 
property." In other words, there appears to be no obligation on the farm.er 
to propose a "plan." If this interpretation is correct, a farmer may apply 
for the redemption even before he offers a "plan." He will do so if he 
can find a lender to finance him. (In fact, his ability to refinance him-
self may even encourage the creditors to make a settlement with him 
under a "plan.") He may offer the "plan" first if he encounters dif-
ficulties in refinancing himself immediately or if he finds his creditors 
agreeable to it. But should the farmer not be obliged to first attempt 
to work out an agreement with his creditors before being permitted to 
redeem through refinancing? Since section 75, as shown above, en-
couraged settlements to avoid a lengthy court procedure. an obligation 
to first attempt a "plan" would seem desirable. On the other hand, argu-
ments may be found for the solution provided for in section 1006: An 
early redemption may speed up the case where creditors would be satisfied 
to be paid out, even at a loss, rather than go through the "plan" proce-
dure or the entire moratorium. During the depression of the thirties 
many institutional lenders lost money by taking over farms which they 
had to sell at a low price. Private lenders may also prefer a cash settle-
ment to any other arrangement. For these creditors it would be better 
if the law would provide that a "plan" can be omitted only by mutual 
consent of creditors and the debtor. But if a "plan" is offered and not 
agreed upon, then a redemption may be applied for. 
(c) However, section 1006 poses another problem with respect to 
the time permitted. According to section 986, the debtor may offer a 
"plan" not later than two years after the date of the entry of the order 
provided for in section 947 (i.e., the moratorium). Section 996 provides 
that "if a plan is pending and not confirmed at the end of the three 
year period . • • the debtor shall be continued in possession until the plan 
has been confirmed or rejected .•.• " (Italics supplied) But under section 
1006, the debtor must file for redemption before the expiration of three years. 
Does this imply that the farmer cannot file for redemption, if, at the end of 
the three-year period the parties still argue aboitt the "plan"? If yes, the 
creditors could Jorestall the debtor's use of section 1006 since the wording 
of the section appears to be restrictive. (Surely the provision in section 
1006 " •.. and where not otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of 
this chapter .... " cannot refer to this eventuality.) Since the law 
specifically envisages the possibility of a "plan" not being confirmed at 
the end of the three-year period (§ 996), section 1006 should be amended 
so as to include any additional time which the court may grant under 
section 996. 
(d) According to section 1028, fees, costs and expenses, including 
the farmer's costs of attorney, are to be paid in full in advance of distri-
bution to creditors, to be shared by them "pro rata." Thus the costs of 
the procedure are borne by the creditors. The opponents of the debt ad-
justment bill have objected to this. If the debtor is insolvent, he will 
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is not borne out by a comparison of the two bills. The procedures 
and the relief provisions, as well as the basic philosophy of the 
moratorium bill, are at variance with the other bill. Hence the 
two bills differ in their usefulness and adequacy. 
The basic goals of the moratorium bill are :29 (1) it should 
be fair and equitable to creditors as well as to debtors so as not 
to dry up agricultural credit; (2) it should be administered ex-
peditiously and economically; (3) it should not provide the same 
remedy for every distressed farmer regardless of the cause of his 
distress; and (4) a moratorium which is co-extensive in time with 
the emergency (which causes the debtor's distress), if followed 
by a re-amortization of the secured debts or by the possibility of 
procuring the benefits of the general bankruptcy laws, is suffi-
cient to provide relief for distressed farmers. 
Hence the draft does not provide for an appraisal of the 
farm, composition, or redemption. (However, the principle of 
no debt adjustment is only adhered to for secured and not for 
unsecured debts.) 
A. Is the Moratorium Bill a Bankruptcy Bill? 
Since the bill provides, in principle, only for changes in the 
payment schedule of the debt, it is questionable whether it still 
retains the essential features of a bankruptcy, or quasi-bank-
ruptcy, procedure which seeks a complete or partial adjustment 
in the financial situation of the debtor. By providing for a mora-
torium as the outstanding method of relief, the bill shifts the 
emphasis from bankruptcy to a federal moratory law; and thus 
introduces a new idea into federal bankruptcy legislation, viz, 
solving the financial difficulties of the farmer-debtors by giving 
them time only.30 Whether such moratory provisions can prop-
hardly be able to pay the court and other costs. On the other hand, 
where a "plan" has been agreed to, it could include a provision for the 
farmer to pay part of the costs out of future earnings. • 
29 See Outline for Farmer Debtor Bankruptcy Legislation (Sept. 1950), 
prepared at the request of the directors of fifty-two cooperative National 
Farm Loan Associations in California, Nevada, Arizona and Utah. Re-
printed in Hearings, supra note 4, at 58. 
It is noteworthy that in 1951 the Land Bank Commissioner testified 
in favor of the debt adjustment bill and was therefore apparently not in 
agreement with the drafters of the moratorium bill. 
30 This assumes that the farmer who asks for relief is only temporarily 
in financial difficulties and bound to overcome them if given sufficient 
time. The debt adjustment bill assumes that the ratio of assets to debts 
is such that some adjustment in the debt structure is imperative. 
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erly become part of the United States bankruptcy laws is an open 
question, 31 hence the constitutionality of such a bill is questionable. 
B. Who Can File 
According to section 906 (7) 32 both owners and tenants can 
file a petition for relief. But the bill is not clearly worded. A 
farmer is defined as "an individual ... primarily engaged in 
producing products of the soil . . . or livestock . . . or livestock 
products . . . and the principal part of whose gross income is 
derived from any one or more of such operations, whether so 
engaged personally or as a tenant or by tenants . . . Provided 
however that the provisions of this chapter shall not be available 
to a farmer whose sole interest in property, as hereinafter de-
fined, is that of tenant." (Italics Supplied) "Property" is de-
fined in section 906 (11) to " ... include all his property, real or 
personal wherever located." 
According to testimony of a representative of the Bankruptcy 
Division of the Administrative Office of the United States courts, 
the moratorium bill "makes the provisions of chapter XVI avail-
able to all farmers within the definition set forth in section 
906 (7) except a tenant farmer . ... "33 But this interpretation 
seems erroneous. The point was referred to by one of the wit-
nesses during the hearings and clarification was requested but 
has not been forthcoming.34 Apparently the drafters of the bill 
intended to include "ordinary tenants" as beneficiaries of the 
chapter. If this was not the intent, then the words "whether so 
engaged personally or as a tenant .... " would certainly make no 
sense. The word "tenant" would then mean a farmer who rents 
31 It is a problem of the definition of bankruptcy and of the right of 
Congress to legislate in matters of bankruptcy. See Kruse, supra note 2, 
at 739. However, Charles Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History 
8 (1935) states: "A steadily expansive interpretation however has been 
given to the Bankruptcy Clause ... And it is now substantially settled by 
legislative practice and by judicial decision . . . that a statute may be 
'on the subject of bankruptcy' without being technically a 'bankruptcy 
law'-in other words that any national law which deals with inability 
to pay debts and which is uniform throughout the country is a law 'on 
the subject of bankruptcy.' " Before the Senate it was argued that this 
moratorium bill introduces a new idea into bankruptcy legislation because 
it makes its use subject to the worthiness of the farmer. However, the 
introduction of a federal judicial moratorium is a much more significant 
innovation. 
32References are to S. 689, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). 
33 Hearings, supra note 4, at 92. The same witness stated that the debt 
adjustment bill makes the relief available to tenants. 
34 Id. at 85-86. 
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a farm but owns all or part of the livestock or implements. On 
the other hand, the "proviso" would intend to exclude those ten-
ants who own neither real property nor livestock nor implements 
on the farm which they operate, i.e., those farmers whose interests 
in any of the property on the farm are only that of tenants. 
The purpose of this "proviso" was probably to exclude share-
croppers and the like. These persons do not usually furnish even 
operating expenses. 
But there are many farm communities where a farmer may 
own neither the land which he farms nor the livestock nor the 
implements on his farm, but furnishes all or part of the operating 
expenses. He would still fall under the definition of a tenant. 
Such arrangements are made, for instance, with beginning farm-
ers and between fathers ~nd sons and are ref erred to as labor-
share leases or arrangements. There is no reason why such a 
tenant should be excluded from the benefits of the law. Also 
sharecroppers, even though they are often held to be laborers, 
should be included, just as industrial wage-earners are entitled 
to use chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act. 
It is therefore recommended that the "proviso" of section 
906 (7) be stricken out for reasons of clarity and fairness. 
G. The Off er of Rental Payments 
After the filing of a petition for relief, the farmer who is 
insolvent or unable to pay his maturing debts must file a state-
ment of his financial affairs (section 924 (2)) and offer a "fair 
and reasonable rental" (section 924 ( 6)). Section 925 provides 
that in determining the rental, the farmer must base his offer 
on the market value of his property, the customary rental value, 
the net income and earning capacity of the property, and "other 
factors." The petitioner's offer is then discussed, among other 
matters, in the creditors' meeting; and if a creditor objects, the 
court will determine the rental (section 939). 
For several reasons these provisions relating to the fixing 
of rentals compare unfavorably with the rental provisions of the 
debt adjustment bill. It is first of all noteworthy that the farmer 
should take the market value of the property into consideration 
in proposing the rental to be paid, but that the bill makes no 
provisions whatever for arriving at such a value since it does not 
provide for an appraisal of the property.35 How then can the 
3& It would appear that in the matter of an appraisal the chairman of 
the sub-committee which held hearings on this legislation was under a 
misapprehension. He stated erroneously that "both bills [i.e., the debt 
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farmer hope to arrive at an estimate of the market value? If he 
is to make a conscientious effort, he may have to appoint and 
pay for an appraiser or appraisers. Thus, in their desire to get 
away from the farm appraisal-a feature which the opponents 
of the Frazier-Lemke Act have always strongly criticized36-the 
drafters of the moratorium bill are putting the farmer-petitioner 
into a paradoxical and unfavorable situation. 
According to the wording of the moratorium bill, the farmer 
must himself determine the fairness and reasonableness of his 
proposal. This is in contrast to the debt adjustment bill where 
the rental is fixed by the court at the creditors' meeting.37 There, 
after the farmer has filed an offer of rental to be paid,38 the court 
fixes the rental by giving consideration to the market value of the 
property and other factors enumerated in the bill.39 The mora-
torium bill therefore appears to place a heavier responsibility and 
a heavier burden of proof on the farmer, particularly if one con-
siders the absence of provisions with respect to an appraisal. 
The moratorium bill also does not take into account "the 
farmer's ability to pay"-like the debt adjustment bill does40-
though it does permit the farmer to "give due consideration . . . 
to the availability of farm income."41 However, this wording has 
a meaning different from "ability to pay" and is only a repetition 
of the words "the actual net income and earning capacity of the 
debtor's property," i.e., the factors which the farmer must con-
sider in determining the rental. 
D. The Creditors' Meeting 
After the approval of the petition, the judge, or a referee to 
whom the proceeding may be ref erred, 42 will call a meeting of 
creditors.43 This meeting plays a more important role in the 
moratorium procedure than in either section 75 or the debt ad-
adjustment bill and the moratorium bill], of course, obviously must con-
tain a first appraisal of the property in order to arrive at any formula 
of installments or rental or whatever it may be." Hearings, supra note 
4, at 62. 
36 E.g., Shall We Have a Permanent Frazier-Lemke Law?, supra note 4, 
at 8. 
37 H.R. 1068, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. § 939(3) (1953). 
38Id. § 934(3). 
39 Id. §§ 944, 945. 
40Id. § 945(3). 
41 S. 689, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 925 (1955). 
42 Id. § 932. 
43 Id. § 933. 
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justment bill because in addition to discussing the ordinary busi-
ness, such as appointing a trustee or the fixing of rentals, the 
court shall determine at that time whether the farmer can or 
cannot benefit from the relief provisions of the chapter. The 
outcome depends on its decision on the cause of the debtor's dis-
tress, or better, on the merits of the case. 
The bill provides for two types of distress : distress caused 
by the farmer's own fault, i.e., due to causes within his control; 
and distress caused by causes beyond his control. 
E. Worthy and Unworthy Farmers 
No relief will' be given under this bill if the farmer is held 
"unworthy" by the court. The bill states specifically that bad 
personal habits, failure to attend to business, diverting farm in-
come to nonagricultural expenditures, extravagant operations and 
lack of farming ability are reasons for denying relief. 
On the other hand, relief will be accorded in cases of na-
tional, regional or local emergencies, i.e., for causes determined 
by the court as being beyond the debtor's control. 
Section 938, which according to its drafters introduces an 
innovation into bankruptcy legislation, merits detailed comments. 
Its purpose is, obviously, to limit the use of the chapter to 
"worthy" farmers. The principle of giving assistance or relief 
to "worthy" or deserving individuals as a safeguard against ob-
taining such relief under false pretenses may have considerable 
merit when the expenditures of public funds are involved. But 
in the case of bankruptcy or moratorium, it is highly question-
able. A debtor's worthiness should not be judged when he is in 
financial difficulties, but at the time when credit is extended to 
him. Normally, it is good business practice to examine a bor-
rower's integrity at the time at which the loan is concluded, and 
it is unlikely that an institutional or even a private lender will 
advance funds to a farmer who is an habitual drunkard, spend-
thrift, or gambler. If they do, they should bear the risk. Often 
lenders advance money on operations of which the financial haz-
ards are known with a correspondingly high rate of interest or 
collateral. The drafters of the bill are also concerned with the 
problem of the use of the bill by "unscrupulous" farmers because 
it has been claimed that section 75 was so abused. But this 
appears to be based on a false premise.44 Fraudulent use of 
chapter XVI before a federal court is indeed quite unlikely. A 
H See note 14 supra. 
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carefully worded law and the integrity of the judicial system 
would prevent such a use.45 
In addition, the manner in which the farmer's worthiness is 
to be determined is subject to criticism. Section 938 appears to 
give the creditors a somewhat preponderant role in arriving at 
this determination. The section states: "At such meeting of 
creditors, or at any adjournment thereof, the court shall deter-
mine whether the debtor's distress is due .... " There is no pro-
vision made for the farmer to be represented or assisted by 
members of his community, though character witnesses could 
possibly be called into the meeting. It would probably be desir-
able to include at least a provision in the law which would give 
the farmer some safeguard against "character assassination." A 
representative of one of the large farm organizations ref erred to 
this provision in his testimony before the Senate sub-committee 
and suggested that the decision of the farmer's worthiness "should 
be removed from the judgment of the creditors entirely."46 This 
could be achieved if the determination of the farmer's worthi-
ness would be made at a time other than the creditors' meeting. 
Finally, the wording of the several "causes within rthe farm-
er's] control" is open to criticism. The proviso "failure to attend 
to business" is vague. What, for instance, if a farmer attempts to 
earn additional income off the farm by selling farm machinery 
or doing custom work for other farmers? The same applies to 
"diverting farm income to non-agricultural expenditures" and 
even more so to "extravagant operations." In the plains states, 
farmers are sometimes called "gamblers" because of the high 
risk inherent in their farm enterprises. What might be an "ex-
travagant" undertaking when the farmer loses might be a sound 
business venture if he succeeds. Therefore, assuming that the 
determination of the worthiness of the farm.er is to remain part 
of the procedure, it would be preferable if the law would simply 
state that the court should order the moratorium if, in its opin-
ion, the farmer is "worthy of relief"-rather than enumerate 
"causes within his control." 
F. Causes Beyond the Farmer's Control 
The moratorium bill enumerates a number of causes beyond 
45 It has been stated that "a court of bankruptcy is invested with equit-
able powers and accordingly could be expected to thwart any unconscion-
able selection by a farmer of the parts to redeem. This furnishes the 
creditor an additional protection." Comment, supra note 1, at 1009. 
While this reasoning was applied to another specific problem, it would 
equally well hold in the matter of abusing the law in general. 
46 Hearings, supra note 4, at 63, 82. 
62 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 
the farmer's control which entitle him to relief under the pro-
posed chapter. These can be sub-divided into (1) causes which 
affect agriculture on a nationwide basis-they include (but are 
not limited to) "national emergencies or declines in the agricul-
tural market, or acreage reductions under the law as a result 
of any of which the farmer-debtor cannot operate at a profit" ;47 
and (2) conditions which are of a local character (including 
probably regional emergencies), i.e., "local emergencies or 
drought, freeze, fire, flood, hail, or insect damage" and presum-
ably cattle disease. 
The wording of this section is not consistent. Drought, 
freeze, fire, etc. are no doubt examples of local emergencies and 
no questions arise with respect to the meaning of local emergency. 
But the term "national emergency" is less clear, and market 
declines or acreage reductions cannot be taken as examples of 
national "emergencies." In fact, the section refers only to the 
effect of a price decline or acreage reduction on individual peti-
tioners, 48 not the effect on a wide section of agriculture which 
would at least be more consistent with the meaning of national 
emergency. Therefore, the determination of a "national emer-
gency" would be left to the interpretation of the courts. Prob-
ably the drafters of the bill had in mind severe, long-lasting 
depressions, such as those of the 1920s and 1930s. 
But did the drafters of the bill really propose this legislation 
with the thought that it would provide for adequate relief in a 
serious depression? This is doubtful. Indeed, it has been ad-
mitted by the supporters of the bill that it is not adequate in a 
severe depression. In presenting the bill to the Senate in 1952, 
the following exchange took place on the floor of the Senate: 
Mr. Hendrickson: I wonder whether the distinguished Senator 
from Washington feels that the enactment of the pending bill 
at this time as permanent legislation would adequately meet a 
widespread emergency in the future? 
Mr. Magnuson: I do not think it would meet a national emer-
gency. In the event of a national emergency I believe we would 
have to do many of the things we did in 1933 for the benefit of 
the farmer. I do think that the pending bill would take care of 
the hardship cases or area cases ... ,49 
4i The first draft (1950) did not refer to price declines or acreage re-
ductions. The amendment was introduced in 1953 after farm incomes 
had declined and S. 689 contains this amendment. S. 689, 84th Cong., 
1st Sess. § 9 3 8 ( 19 5 5). However, H.R. 6 7 0 still carries the original 
text. See H.R. 670, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 938 (1955). 
4SS. 689, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 938 (1955). 
·19 98 Cong. Rec. 3513 (1952). 
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In the Hearings, the same thought was expressed by a repre-
sentative of the National Grange: 
We do not believe that S. 25 as amended will meet the needs 
of the country and agriculture if a prolonged depression reduces 
the general level of land values below general mortgage levels 
that are in force. Such a condition would call for extraordinary 
legislation to prevent wholesale transfer of farm land from 
family farm owners to non-agricultural ownership. At such time 
the necessary emergency legislation could and should be passed. 
But to place it [i.e. the emergency legislation] on the statute 
books, we believe, would impair the farmers' ability to obtain 
adequate amounts of credit at equitable interest rates. S. 25 as 
amended, as we interpret it, does not contemplate taking care 
of such general depression credit distress. For credit distress 
other than that which is caused by prolonged depression, from 
sickness or other bad luck, and for distress from drought or 
other natural hazards S. 25 (a) amended appears to us to ade-
quately meet the reasonable needs of both creditors and deb-
tors .... 5o 
If the moratorium bill is not intended, nor adequate, to cover 
a "nationwide emergency," but is intended to "take care of hard-
ship cases or area cases . . . of cases which would happen in a 
certain area or in a certain valley, where farmers could not meet 
their obligations because of weather conditions, blights or condi-
tions of that sort," then the wording of the legislation is in con-
tradiction to its intent. The courts which have to interpret the 
50 Hearings, supra note 4, at 75. This testimony was, however, some-
what contradictory and it is not clear where and whether the witness 
stated the official position of the Grange or his own convictions in the 
matter. The witness stated earlier: "During the last 20 years the 
nature of farming has so changed that farm income is more vulnerable 
than ever. Cash farm costs are now higher and more rigid than ever 
before, also the farm family living costs are greatly changed and more 
rigid. This means that unfavorable farm crops due to widespread and 
prolonged drouth or unfavorable prices could create another wave of 
farm foreclosures unless the farm credit laws of this nation recognize 
the irregular nature of farm income and provide flexibility accordingly. 
During relatively prosperous times many people . • . take on excessive 
debt if there are lenders willing to lend them the money. It would be 
wise social policy to pass a moratorium law now so that the over-opti-
mistic people, both lenders and borrowers, will not take unrealistic gam-
bles. Especially should we prevent lenders from using the mortgage and 
foreclosure instrument to reap the savings of over-optimistic or inex-
perienced people. . . . Unless the creditor wishes to foreclose and take 
some unjust advantage of the distressed farmer, it is to the interest of 
both creditor and debtor to keep the farmer in full operating responsibility 
on the farm." Id. at 74, 75. It is the very "excessive debt" on a farm 
that would make a scaledown, and not a moratorium, necessary when a 
depression of some duration strikes in order to keep the farmer on the 
farm. 
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meaning of "national emergency" which is, at any rate, a rather 
indefinite term will find no clarification in the legislators' state-
ments.u1 
It is even doubtful whether the proposed chapter would be 
adequate in regional emergencies such as a drought of long dura-
tion over a wide area of the country. 
Two apparent reasons were given for proposing a bill which 
is admittedly inadequate to meet the situation which it states 
specifically it can meet. First, when the bill was first drafted and 
discussed in Congress, optimism in continued agricultural pros-
perity was high and affected its drafters. 
The second reason is the expectation that the enactment of 
a "moderate" bill would forestall or prevent more drastic legisla-
tion, such as section 75, in a severe depression. This thought was 
expressed in the Hearings in the following exchange: 
Senator Magnuson: Of course, what happens in this situation 
is this: if we ran into another national problem such as we had 
from 1929 on, Congress is going to pass something like this 
anyway, like the Frazier Lemke Act, for the emergency, and we 
might be better off in the long run if we would establish some 
permanent, fair, equitable procedures that would take care of 
the situation if and when it occurred. 
llfr. Ferguson: This is our position. 
Senator Magnuson: I am afraid that we might get even a much 
more radical type of legislation if we let this go until the thing 
happens. I have been with legislative bodies for so long that I 
can foresee that. 
Mr. Downie: If you act dispassionately right now, you might 
produce better legislation. 
Senator Magnuson: It can be done more calmly now and some 
procedure can be established that would make fair relief avail-
ul The meaning or interpretation of the term "national emergency" 
by the courts is important because according to section 942, the court 
may have to determine that the emergency has ceased whereupon the 
moratorium shall terminate. S. 689, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 942 (1955). 
Kruse, supra note 2, at 739 draws attention to the fact that even under 
section 75(s)(6) (11 U.S.C. § 203(s)(6)), which contained a similar pro-
vision, no court ever held that the emergency ceased to exist in its locality. 
The courts would be all the more confused if in trying to interpret the 
term "national emergency" they were to look at the legislators' intent 
and discover that they did not mean this act to apply in such a case. It 
is hardly necessary to emphasize that the passage of a complicated bill to 
give relief primarily for local emergencies, which can usually be taken 
care of by the local credit institutions, or with the aid of federal emer-
gency loans, cannot be advocated. 
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able when it was needed, rather than to have it happen and have 
everybody stand up and go off on tangents with maybe what is 
unsound and unwise legislation.52 
This point of view is debatable. Since chapter XVI is to be 
a permanent piece of legislation, an attempt should be made to 
make it adequate in the long run, i.e., in prosperity and depres-
sion. Inadequate legislation might precipitate, rather than fore-
stall, drastic action, while adequate legislation might possibly 
prevent altogether the occurrence of mass foreclosures and bank-
ruptcies. 
G. The Moratorium 
If the farmer's distress is due to causes beyond his control, 
a judicial moratorium is authorized by the court "for the dura-
tion of the emergency, without expressly limiting the moratorium 
to a term of years."53 
According to section 942, creditors may ask for a new hear-
ing at two year intervals to determine whether the emergency has 
ceased to exist. If the moratorium threatens to last more than 
four years, creditors may appeal the determination of a judge, 
or of a referee, that the emergency has not ceased to exist. But 
the provisions with respect to this appeal are confused. Origin-
ally the draft provided that if the determination of the con-
tinued emergency was made by a judge, a creditor could appeal 
to an appellate court; that if the determination was made by a 
referee, he could petition for review by a judge, and that the de-
termination by a judge on review was not subject to appeal. 
Section 942 further stated: "If a judge, after a review or an ap-
pellate court, on appeal, determines that the emergency still 
exists, such determination shall continue the moratorium in full 
52 Hearings, supra note 4, at 46. The same thought has been expressed 
more eloquently by the President of the Federal Land Bank of California, 
Hearings, supra note 4, at 1·0: l\Ir. Dean: "Further, ever since the 
lapsing of the Frazier Lemke .Act in l\Iarch, 1949, there has been agitation 
for legislation involving scaling down which would be very detrimental to 
farmers and lenders generally. That has been a hazard. . . . The bill 
which was actually passed by the Senate in 1949 almost went through the 
House." l\Ir. Wilson (Rep. from Texas): "26 to 1 on this full committee. 
They reconsidered it later." Mr. Dean: "That makes me shudder and 
I am sure of this in the lending field that the farmers would not want to 
see the drying up of credit. They would shudder at the narrow escape. 
Until such time as we have legislation on the statute books, there is al-
ways the hazard that it might happen. We entered into it because of the 
emergency that this was almost passed. . . ." 
53 S. 689, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 938 (1955). 
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force and effect. " One Senator asked the chairman of the 
sub-committee on the floor of the Senate :54 
llfr. Hendrickson: I also understand, ... that no appeal to the 
Supreme Court is provided for in the bill. Is that correct? 
ilir. Magnuson: That is correct. . . . We determined as a matter 
of policy not to allow an appeal because we felt that an appeal 
might delay relief. The other point of view, as given to us by 
witnesses who appeared before the committee, was that without 
the right of appeal we might bog things down very badly. It 
was a matter of policy. 
The Senator then indicated that he would introduce an a-
mendment which would permit an appeal to the Supreme Court, 
but upon further discussion agreed to omit the word "not" from 
the sentence: "The determination by a judge on review shall 
not be subject to appeal." But does the omission of the word 
"not" now authorize· creditors to appeal to the Supreme Court? 
This is doubtful because the further text: "If a judge, after a 
review or an appellate court, on appeal, determines that the emer-
gency still exists, such determination shall continue the mora-
torium in full force and effect. . . ." has not been modified and 
can be interpreted as not permitting an appeal to the Supreme 
Court. If they are not so interpreted, they are superfluous and 
should be omitted. In conclusion, it would, therefore, appear 
that an appeal by creditors to the Supreme Court is still not possi-
ble as the bill now stands. 55 This would introduce a new element 
into bankruptcy procedure, the desirability of which is not cer-
tain. True, the proceedings could be speeded up if no appeal to 
the Supreme Court by creditors were permitted. But while the 
lower courts may be well qualified to make decisions as to "local" 
emergencies, the question of "national" emergencies should be 
subject to review by the Supreme Court, if only for the purpose 
of obtaining an authoritative definition of this elusive term. 
Section 942 further provides that where a creditor has asked 
for such a review, or has appealed to the higher court, any credi-
tor, i.e., not necessarily the same creditor, may now ask for hear-
ings at one year intervals, and he may appeal a referee's or a 
judge's order that the emergency still exists. Though the bill 
does not specifically say so, it must be assumed that also in this 
case the decision of the appellate court is not subject to appeal. 
ia 98 Cong. Rec. 3513-14 (1952). 
Gu While S. 689 was passed by the Senate in July 1955, with this amend-
ment, H.R. 670 still carries the original text prohibiting an appeal by a 
creditor of a determination by a judge on review. H.R. 670, 84th Cong., 
1st Sess. § 942 (1955). 
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If the moratorium thTeatens to extend over more than four 
years, but no creditor appeals the decision of a referee or a judge 
that the emergency still exists, then the bill probably gives the 
creditors the right to further hearings only at two year intervals. 
Section 942 raises two more problems. (a) Both secured 
and unsecured creditors may individually appeal the decision of 
a referee or a judge that the emergency still exists since the 
section gives that right to "any" creditor. In practice, unsecured 
lenders will be among the first to raise the question of the con-
tinued emergency because of the preferential treatment which the 
bill gives secured creditors in later phases of the proceedings. In 
the event that the provisions on "emergencies" are left in the 
bill, a preferable possibility would be to allow an appeal or re-
view only upon a majority vote of the creditors, by class. (b) 
The section deals specifically with the creditors' but not with 
the debtors' right to appeal. Since the section refers to the 
confirmation of the continuation of the emergency, the farm-
er is assumed to be in full agreement with the continuation of 
the emergency which gives him extended relief. But upon closer 
examination of the debtors' right to appeal where a determina-
tion is made that the emergency has ceased to exist-and hence 
the moratorium is at an end-section 942, while dealing only 
with creditors, may have a bearing on the debtor's rights to 
appeal. 
Section 943 provides that the farmer may ask for a review 
by a judge of an order made by a referee as provided in section 
39 ( c) of the act. An "order by a referee" would obviously in-
clude the determination of the question whether or not the emer-
gency-and hence the moratorium-continues to exist. The farm-
er, who has a vital interest in this determination, would prob-
ably ask for review only if he disagrees with the referee's de-
termination that the emergency has ceased to exist. Section 943 
does not limit in any way the farmer's right to appeal a judge's 
decision upon review. But what if, under section 942, a judge on 
review, or the appellate court, reverses the original determination 
by a referee or by a judge that the emergency continues to exist 
and now finds that the emergency has ceased to exist? Since 
section 942 specifically limits only the creditors' right to appeal 
to the appellate court as the highest instance and not the farmer's, 
it must be assumed that the farmer may appeal to the Supreme 
Court a reversal of the determination that the emergency con-
tinues to exist. Whether or not this was the intention of the 
drafters or whether this problem has been overlooked cannot be 
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stated. If this interpretation is correct, it would probably afford 
the debtor adequate protection in all cases. 
H. During the Moratorium 
During the moratorium, the farmer (1) retains possession 
of the farm under supervision of the court, (2) may be required 
to file reports on his farming operations,56 and (3) must pay 
rentals to the court57 and additional payments may be i·equired 
from him.58 
According to section 1016 (b) , where the debtor defaults in 
the payment of rentals or defaults under any other order, the 
court may end the proceedings under this chapter if within 60 
days such default is not cured. This appears to be a very harsh 
provision. What would the farmer do under the bill if the mora-
torium had been ordered in a drought year and the drought con-
tinues for several years with varying intensity as to make him 
unable to pay the agreed upon rental? It would appear that sec-
tion 1016(b), as it is worded, will make the very purpose of the 
bill (i.e., to give farmers relief through giving them adequate 
time to recover in cases of emergency) illU}Sory. Section 1016(b) 
is much more severe than the corresponding section of the debt 
adjustment bill which provides that the court "may allow the 
debtor to cure the default upon such terms and conditions as the 
court may prescribe, giving due consideration to the financial cir-
cumstances of the debtor and the interests of the creditors."59 
I. After the Moratorium: The "Extension" Proposal 
Within two months after the declaration of the end of the 
emergency, i.e., after the end of the moratorium, the farmer may 
ask for an extension.60 It should be noted that the bill does not 
authorize the farmer to apply for an extension du.rring the mora-
torium as does the debt adjustment bill. 
The wording of section 986 is unfortunate. It states that 
"the debtor may file a notice of election wherein he may elect an 
extension." The term "elect" would imply an alternative method 
of relief, such as a composition or a redemption. As a matter of 
fact, the farmer has no alternative under the bill because, if he 
does not "elect" the extension, the proceedings under the chapter 
would automatically be terminated.61 
56 S. 689, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 944 (1955). 
u7 Id. § 939. 
GS Id. § 945. 
G9 H.R. 1068, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. § 959 (1953). 
GOS. 689, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 986 (1955). 
61Id. § 1016(c). 
WHAT KIND OF BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION FOR FARMERS? 69 
Also the farmer is assumed not to be entitled to a composi-
tion (debt adjustment). But this applies only for secured debts, 
i.e., real estate and chattel mortgages, not for unsecured debts.02 
Section 987 amplifies on the proposal for e:id;ension and states 
that the farmer must provide: 
••• for full payment of his secured claims amortized over a term 
of years, which term of years shall be based upon the earning 
power of the property that is security for the debt as determined 
by the court, but not exceeding the greater of ten years or the 
original term of years, payable in equal quarterly, semi-annual 
or annual installments, plus interest at the contract rate or 6 
per centum per annum, whichever is the lesser, and such extension 
proposal shall provide for payment of unsecured debts, for which 
claims have been filed and allowed • • • to the extent and on the 
terms which the debtor believes he will have the ability to pay 
from his future income.63 
Thus the proposal for extension actually includes a proposal for 
the composition of unsecured debts and therefore the term is 
erroneous since an e)l..'iension, by definition, cannot mean a com-
position. 
Section 987 is unique. It is in contrast to all other chapters 
of the United States bankruptcy laws. By failing to provide the 
farmer with the possibility of adjusting his debt-structure, it 
overlooks completely the fact that a bankruptcy procedure is de-
signed to help adjust the financial situation of a debtor who is 
insolvent.64 Are we to assume that a farmer who is "in the red" 
62 Here again the chairman of the subcommittee holding hearings ap-
peared to be in error. The representative of the Farmers Union said: 
Mr. McDonald: " ... Now unless I misread this measure, the farmer 
would have to pay back the entire sum as agreed on." Senator Magnuson: 
"The entire sum as modified by the hearing and the appraisals and the 
pro rata sums which the referees may determine." Mr. McDonald: "Then 
if this bill provides for a scaling down, I withdraw that objection to it." 
Senator Magnuson: "It is a technical matter [!] ... " Hearings, supra 
note 4, at 62. Apparently the chairman was not too well acquainted with 
the text of the bill. 
63 The interest rate provided for in section 987 was criticized by the 
representative of the Farmers Union as being "ridiculously high" and he 
suggested a rate of four per cent. Hearings, supra note 4, at 80. Senator 
Magnuson referred to this suggestion in his statement before the Senate, 
and reported that "the committee adopted the compromise of 5 percent." 
98 Cong. Rec. 3514 (1952). However, H.R. 670 now before the House 
still contains the sb: per cent rate. H.R. 670, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 987 
(1955). 
M For arguments in favor of a scale-down, see testimony of Fred H. 
Kruse, Hearings, supra note 2, and testimony of the Land Bank Commis-
sioner, Hearings, supra note 4, at 65. 
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is financially better able to overcome his difficulties than a corpo-
ration, or a railroad company, or a wage-earner? 
The section also discriminates in favor of secured creditors, 
i.e., mortgagors who may be institutional or private lenders, and 
against unsecured creditors.65 Such discriminatory treatment is 
hardly justified if one keeps in mind today's relatively low real 
estate indebtedness and the large operating expenses of modern-
ized farming. If one were to follow the logic of the drafters of 
the moratorium bill, whose main concern was that a debt ad-
justment type law would "dry up credit to farmers" and thus be 
against the interests of the farmers themselves, this bill if passed 
by Congress would threaten credit to farmers much more than a 
Frazier-Lemke type bill because local banks, feed dealers, oil 
stations and implement dealers, who now advance much credit 
without security, would attempt to discontinue their practices 
and make no credit available to farmers without collateral.66 
In the third place, section 987 apparently does not allow the 
debtor to refinance himself and to pay out his unsecured credi-
tors in a lump sum. While a scale-down of the unsecured debts 
is permissible, they must be paid back out of the future income 
of the farm. This may have certain advantages for the farmer, 
but only if he cannot find other soUl·ces of credit, and it may 
have disadvantages for the unsecured creditors who may wish 
to be paid out at the end of the moratorium if the farmer can 
obtain funds to refinance himself. 
The proposed payment plan is to be based on the income 
earning ability of the farm. As previously mentioned, this is 
not determined in a formal manner by an appraisal. Since the 
income earning power of the farm is a basic factor in the deter-
65 The representative of the Farmers Union characterized the bill as a 
"bankers' bill." Hearings, supra note 4, at 63. See also Kruse, supra 
note 2, at 741-42. One of the guiding thoughts in this bill was the argu-
ment that the "original contract" entered into by the debtor is "inviolate" 
and should therefore not be interfered with. This argument is, however, 
erroneous and has been abandoned in our legal system, particularly in 
bankruptcy proceedings, long ago. or else debtors in default would still 
be put into jail. That a composition for unsecured debts is possible under 
this bill is evidently not very consistent. In this connection is the phrase, 
"The extension proposal when approved by the court shall have the full 
force and effect of a binding contract for redemption between the af-
fected parties," in section 988, not both misleading and superfluous? 
66 The 1955 Nebraska Legislature, for instance, considered-but did 
not pass-several bills which proposed a lien in favor of oil companies 
and others on crops produced with the gas, oil, etc., sold by them to the 
farmers. 
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mination of the payments to be made under the "e}...'tension" pro-
posal, the burden of proof lies again, as in the case of the rentals, 
primarily on the farmer; and in the absence of more specific 
guiding principles, the bargaining power of the parties will have 
a determining influence on the final payment provisions. 
J. Confirmation of the "Extension" Proposal 
The extension proposal must be confirmed by the court.67 If 
approved, the original debt structure of the secured debts remains 
intact, but the contract may be modified as to maturity, interest 
rate and repayment schedule; unsecured debts may be scaled 
down. If creditors are opposed to the proposal, the court may 
take their objections into consideration and confirm a modified 
plan. Section 988 states : 
If written objections are filed, the court shall consider the writ-
ten objections or hear the objecting party and shall enter an 
order in accordance with the proof, approving the proposal as 
submitted, or modifying it as to the objecting party [i.e. the 
creditor or creditors] and approving it as modified. 
This provision assumes that the confirmation by the court of 
some plan-the debtor's original plan or a modification of it-
will take place once the farmer has "elected" to ask for an ex-
tension. But what if the farmer does not agree-and feels that 
due to his weak financial position in the wake of the emergency 
he cannot comply-with the proposal as modified by the court 
in consideration of the objection of one or several creditors? 
Must the court confirm a plan to which the debtor does not con-
sent without regard to his ability to rehabilitate himself? Must 
the farmer submit to the plan? The text of section 988 leaves 
the court with no alternative. As it now stands, this section is 
not equitable for the farmer. The debt adjustment bill is more 
regardful of the debtor's situation. Section 99368 provides that: 
After a plan has been accepted by creditors, alterations or modifi-
cations of the plan may, with leave of court, be proposed in 
writing by the debtor. 
and section 99769 provides that: 
The court shall confirm a plan if satisfied that . . . ( 3) it will 
result in the financial rehabilitation of the debtor .... 
If the creditors' objections to the extension proposal are obviously 
adamant, the court may ignore their objections ("the court shall 
67 S. 689, 84th Cong .. 1st Sess. § 988 (1955). 
6SH.R. 1068, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. § 993 (1953). 
69 Id. § 997. 
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consider the written objections .... "), and thus the farmer en-
joys a certain amount of protection; but this is at the discretion 
of the court, and the bill is silent as to the criteria which the 
court is to use in adopting or rejecting the creditors' objections. 
If past experience is a guide, the lower courts will give farmers in 
distress little sympathy. 
Under section 988 any individual creditor may object to the 
proposal regardless of the size or nature of his claim. Unsecured 
creditors are likely to be more adversely affected by the "exten-
sion" than secured creditors, whose claims cannot be scaled down. 
Hence, unsecured creditors may be the first to object to a pro-
posal which reflects the farmer's weak financial position. Just 
exactly how are creditors going to agree among themselves? On 
this point the moratorium bill is also silent. The provisions of 
the debt adjustment bill offer greater protection to the farmer, 
and incidentally also to creditors, by providing for majority ac-
ceptance by the creditors of a "plan."7° 
If the court confirms or threatens to confirm a modified ex-
tension plan, under which the farmer feels that he cannot re-
habilitate himself, the latter may: (1) Accept the modified pro-
posal and attempt to live up to it. If his financial condition re-
mains weak, he can file another petition and obtain another mora-
torium. If his distressed situation is not due to causes within 
his control, he may be granted further relief. The bill contains 
no provision barring a farmer from using the relief more than 
once, though the question of introducing such a restriction has 
been discussed. But whether the court will give the farmer's 
second petition a sympathetic hearing at the creditors' meeting, 
which determines the cause of the farmer's distress, is doubtful. 
(2) He may ask that the proceedings be dismissed (though this 
is not expressly stated in the bill) or ask that the proceedings be 
transferred to chapter XII of the act which enables him to reach 
a composition or extension agreement with his creditors.71 
70 Id. § 990. 
71 Before the introduction of the moratorium bill, its supporters held 
that chapter XII would afford farmers adequate relief. It is not clear 
whether or not the moratorium bill now authorizes a farmer to transfer 
to a chapter XII proceeding. According to section 1015, the debtor may 
apply "during the moratorium" for a transfer to a proceeding under 
chapters I-VII. But the bill d,oes not specify what he may do after the 
moratorium. Since most commentators agree that chapter XII was not 
specifically designed to assist farmers and will therefore not give them 
adequate relief, it is not certain that the farmer would gain anything by 
asking for such a transfer. 
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Can the farmer withdraw his extension proposal? If yes, 
section 1016 provides that if the debtor has not filed an extension 
the court may adjudge him a bankrupt and direct that bank-
ruptcy be proceeded with (this is mandatory in ce1·tain cases) or 
dismiss the proceeding, whichever in the opinion of the court may 
be in the interest of creditors. But the bill does not specifically 
state that the farmer has the right to withdraw his proposal. In 
contrast, the debt adjustment bill envisages this possibility.72 
K. After the Confirmation of the "Extension" 
If an extension proposal has been confirmed by the court, 
the entire proceedings are terminated by discharging the farmer 
and the trustee. 73 The farmer shall make all required payments 
directly to the persons entitled thereto.74 These provisions are in 
contrast to the provisions of the debt adjustment bill which states 
that the "plan" may, for the period of eA'iension, provide for the 
operation of the farm and the management of the property with 
or without supervision or control by a trustee, a committee of 
creditors or otherwise.w Under section 999 of H.R. 1068 the 
court may also retain jurisdiction over the debtor until the ex-
tension period has expired and may issue such orders as may be 
necessary to effectuate the provisions of the extension agreement. 
While the provisions of the moratorium bill may reduce the time 
during which the proceedings remain under control of the court, 
a desirable objective, they offer the creditors less protection that 
the terms of the extension proposal will be observed. By the 
same token, they may prove to be less favorable for the farmer 
if he should encounter temporary difficulties in living up to the 
extension agreement. 
L. The Length of the Proceeding 
It has been claimed by the drafters that a procedure under 
the moratorium bill would be less lengthy than under the debt 
adjustment bill or section 75.76 It is doubtful whether this as-
sertion is correct. The procedure depends on the length of the 
emergency, which is impossible to predict. Since the moratorium 
is of an indefinite duration, the procedure could last for ten years 
or more. 
72H.R. 1068, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1002 (1953). 
73 S. 689, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1018 (19.55). 
74 Id. § 988. 
75 H.R. 1068, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. § 988 (1·0) (1953). 
76 The majority of section 75 procedures in the Dakotas did not extend 
over six to twelve months. 
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It has been stated elsewhere that an unlimited moratorium 
would cause the bankruptcy courts to be clogged by a large num-
ber of cases for a long period of time. 77 The supporters of the 
moratorium bill apparently confuse the issue of the "length of 
the procedure" with that of the "simplicity of procedure." Since 
the moratorium bill contains no provisions as to appraisal, com-
position of secured debts, redemption, etc., it would result in a 
simpler, less complicated procedure which may give rise to fewer 
appeals or litigations. This assumes that the bill is clearly word-
ed and contains few loopholes-an assumption that an analysis 
of the moratorium bill does not warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
The study of the operation of section 75 and the analysis of 
the major substantative and procedural provisions of the mora-
torium bill lead to the conclusion that its defects are numerous 
and its adequacy as permanent farm relief legislation highly 
questionable. Its passage by Congress cannot be advocated. 
The bill has been inspired, to a large extent, by the hostility 
of its drafters to the Frazier-Lemke Act and similar legislation. 
But this hostility is based on a misunderstanding and misinterpre-
tation of the objectives of the Frazier-Lemke Act; of its value in 
effectuating a compromise between the interests of agriculture, 
of lenders and of society; and of the conditions under which it 
has operated in practice. 
The bill appears to be as hastily drafted and poorly worded 
and as replete with loopholes as section 75. Some of its major 
provisions are contrary to the intent of its supporters. This in-
troduces an element of deception. 
It ignores almost entirely the experiences, both legal and 
practical, gained throughout the lifetime of section 75. By the 
same token, it ignores the experiences gained under other chap-
ters of the Bankruptcy Act. It introduces entirely new concepts 
-some of which are undesirable or possibly outside the scope of 
a bankruptcy procedure, and hence may be held unconstitutional. 
It gives relief to farmers only hesitantly; and what it gives 
with one hand, it appears to take away with the other. Conse-
quently, it cannot be easily defended from the accusation that it 
favors the creditor more than debtor. 
It puts secured creditors in a more favored position than un-
77 Kruse, supra note 3, at 739. 
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secured creditors; and among secured creditors, institutional 
lenders would occupy a privileged position. 
If the "drying up" of credit to farmers is the major objec-
tion to a debt adjustment bill, then the moratorium bill may be 
still more objectionable; its effects on the conditions under which 
short-run and intermediate loans are given to farmers could be 
far-reaching. With farmers' cash expenses, and hence credit 
needs, being at a high level, this could result in further rationing 
credit to farmers. Also the unfavorable position of unsecured 
creditors in the procedure, as provided by the bill, makes the re-
habilitation of farmers in distress cases more . questionable. The 
failure to permit refinancing by farmers through composition or 
redemption may be disadvantageous, not only for farmers, but 
also for those creditors-both secured and unsecured-who can-
not easily withstand the effects of a prolonged moratorium. 
For these reasons, the moratorium bill is only a poor alter-
native to the debt adjustment bill drafted by the N.B.C. 
